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ABSTRACT
Inequality offends our moral sensibilities, yet 
there is no urgency to address it. This article 
explains the lack of an adequate response 
to inequality by outlining two apparatuses 
conspiring to perpetuate inequality – rational 
justification and interpassivity. The current 
state of inequality is bolstered by a variety of 
philosophical and economic rationalisations. 
However, even when these justifications fail, 
a system that maintains inequality survives 
through an ideological mechanism that allows 
collective delusions to be sustained without 
owners. Put differently, because others believe 
on our behalf, we can act in accordance with 
failed assumptions. To address inequality 
requires addressing these apparatuses.
Keywords: inequality, interpassivity, moral 
impulse, John Caputo, Slavoj Žižek
INTRODUCTION: EQUALITY FOR 
INEQUALITY’S SAKE
Equality is not pursued for its own sake. 
Promoting equality, and denouncing a state of 
inequality, serves two greater and more prized 
forms of inequality – one that we clumsily call 
‘ethics’, and another that we awkwardly call 
‘individualism’. Put differently, inequality is the 
most urgent of moral concerns in society, but 
one which we are yet to address seriously. To 
address economic inequality would therefore 
mean to finally start meeting our infinite moral 
obligations towards others (to heed the call of 
that asymmetrical relationship with others, 
called ‘ethics’). Addressing economic inequality 
also allows us to better invest our energies in 
the more fulfilling task of developing what is 
delightful in us, of ‘expressing a personality’, 
of becoming unequal in a way that neither 
invites scorn, nor causes ill conscience, i.e. to 
allow everyone to experiment existentially (to 
express individuality), not only those who are 
accidentally privileged enough to do so.
As things stand, unfortunately, economic 
rationality trumps ethics (or the moral impulse 
to address inequality), and inequality thwarts 
the work of personality. Consequently, we do 
not even try to meet our moral obligations, 
and the task of self-creation is near impossible 
for most people. These tasks (the ethical and 
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the existential) are delayed in contemporary 
society, and will remain delayed until academics, 
politicians, and practitioners have proven 
themselves equal, at least, to the task.
This, then, is the focus of this article: the 
question, What is the task to which we must be 
equal? To address this question, I will consider 
a set of related questions, including:
 ▪ What part of inequality irritates our moral 
sensibilities?
 ▪ How is this form of inequality rationalised?
 ▪ What is the price of inequality and its 
rationalisations? and
 ▪ What prevents us from addressing it?
I will argue that inequality, together with 
its resultant individual and social costs, is 
sustained through an apparatus of justification. 
The economic system of free market capitalism 
is built on a misleading and counterproductive 
philosophical edifice. But even when cracks 
in the foundation become apparent, our 
participation in the system is not threatened. 
To understand why, and why no real attempt is 
made to address inequality, the contemporary 
workings of ideology are explained with 
reference to the work of Slavoj Žižek (1989; 
2012), and to the concept of ‘interpassivity’. 
In short, the economic common sense of free 
market capitalism does not require our belief 
or allegiance. We can act as if we believe ‘the 
system’ works because others believe on our 
behalf. In order to (finally) address inequality, 
therefore, the rationalisations of inequality 
must continually be undermined, and new bases 
for interpassivity must be explored.
THE INEQUALITY THAT OFFENDS
Of course, not all inequalities are equal. Some 
inequalities are desirable. The inequality that 
offends morality – inequality understood as 
a general societal failure and a general moral 
imperative – is of a specific kind. To describe it, 
one can offer three qualifications.
First, the inequality that offends in this age is 
economic. Although we still identify previously 
unarticulated forms of political inequality, and 
although we remain concerned with the unequal 
treatment of women (for instance) in large parts 
of the world, the more pressing issue today is 
not political inequality. It is not the denial of 
rights and freedoms and vast inequalities before 
the law. Instead, it is the unequal distribution of 
the means of economic exchange and material 
security. Not because all necessary political 
rights have been articulated or addressed, but 
because the dilemma of economic inequality has 
repeatedly been articulated unsuccessfully. The 
iteration of the problem has never translated 
into an urgent moral imperative. Contemporary 
society makes no real effort to end economic 
inequality of the kind I describe here. The 
implications of this failure are felt, inevitably, in 
the realm of (political) freedoms.
A second, fairly obvious point is that the 
inequality that offends is a judgement 
concerning a certain relationship. Inequality 
is not an absolute measure, but a relative one. 
What concerns us, on the face of it, is neither 
abundance nor scarcity, neither plenty nor 
want. Instead, what raises ethical concerns is 
the co-existence of abundance and scarcity. 
If want were generalised, it would be tragic, 
but not an object of moral concern (unless, 
of course, the state of general scarcity were 
avoidable). Similarly, if the human condition 
were universally characterised by material 
excess, we might mourn the loss of ‘spirit’ that 
accompanied the struggle for existence, but we 
would not denounce the animal that resulted 
from this condition for the condition.
The third qualification is that economic 
inequality itself is not what sparks the moral 
impulse. We may be envious of those who have 
more than us, but we do not rebel against a 
situation in which it is possible for some to have 
more than others, materially speaking. While 
the contentment of the affluent is hateful to us, 
it is hateful in a way that is appealing enough to 
act as the object of consumption, of enjoyment 
even. Therefore, it is the lower end on the scale 
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of inequality that demands moral intervention 
– that some have so little that they suffer, or 
that their humanity is diminished by it, while 
there seems to be ample material to go around. 
Inevitably, however, addressing the lower end 
of the scale of inequality entails a change in 
thinking that must affect how we view the 
upper end of the scale.
Inequality as a moral concern can therefore be 
described as the condition that unnecessarily 
allows for the distribution of exchange capacity 
and material security in such a way that some 
individuals suffer and are unable to attain, ‘the 
good life’.
At this stage, it is important to address a possible 
objection. Economists would convince us that 
inequality and poverty (which I appear to 
conflate here) are two separate issues. Poverty, 
we are told, refers to “falling below a certain 
level of income” (Taylor, 2012:98). Inequality, on 
the other hand, refers to “the gap between those 
with low and high income” (Taylor, 2012:98). 
These phenomena are not directly correlated. 
Poverty rates may fall as inequality rises (when 
a strong economy helps poor citizens to get 
slightly richer, while the rich get much richer). 
Alternatively, inequality could fall while the 
poverty rate rises (when economic collapses 
bring many of the rich closer to the poor). 
Finally, poverty and inequality raise different 
moral concerns. When we take issue with 
poverty, it is out of sympathy for those without 
the means to enjoy basic necessities. When we 
take issue with inequality, we are motivated by 
ideas of fairness or justice.
Yet, today, poverty and inequality cannot be 
treated separately. Treating them separately is 
what allows morally indefensible inequality to 
continue. These phenomena cannot be separated, 
because ‘more inequality’ is offered as the 
solution to existing inequality. Additionally, the 
extent of existing inequality testifies of (global) 
productive capacity sufficient to provide for the 
needs of the many, yet is unflinchingly focused 
on the needs of few. This is the old and still valid 
Marxist argument that capitalism has served 
its historical function of developing the means 
of production to such a level that poverty and 
hunger can be eliminated. Yet, we maintain and 
defend arrangements that ensure that only the 
needs of some are met, and in such a way that 
waste is a necessary part of the arrangement.
THE MORAL RESPONSE TO 
INEQUALITY
That economic inequality, as I have described 
it above, calls for a response needs no rational 
defence. The moral impulse (even if its 
manifestations and associated attitudes, beliefs, 
and practices must be historically understood) 
reacts to it spontaneously. Before we can 
articulate objections to inequality framed in 
terms of justice, the common good, equality, 
intrinsic value, or fundamental rights, the 
experience of inequality has already elicited 
a moral response, a sense of ‘wrongness’, an 
immediate intuition that something must 
be done.
The work of John Caputo (1993) usefully and 
poetically describes the felt response that 
constitutes the ethical experience. According 
to Caputo, we do not reason ourselves into an 
obligation towards ‘the Other’. The obligation 
is there before we start talking about it, and it 
binds or haunts us, even after we stop talking 
or acting:
To say that obligations ‘happen’ is to say that 
obligation is not anything that I have brought 
about, not anything I have negotiated, but rather 
something that happens to me. Obligations do 
not ask for my consent. Obligation is not like a 
contract I have signed after having had a chance 
first to review it carefully and to have consulted 
my lawyer. It is not anything I have agreed to be 
a party to. It binds me. (Caputo, 1993:7)
According to Caputo (1993), therefore, moral 
theory does not establish or even motivate 
the ethical relation. Moral theory is added 
retrospectively, to justify and explain logically 
what it is we experience:
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Obligation calls, and it calls for justice, but the 
caller in the call is not identifiable, decidable. 
I cannot make it out. I cannot say that the call 
is the voice of God, or of Pure Practical Reason, 
or of a social contract ‘we’ have all signed, 
or a trace of the form of the Good stirring in 
our souls or the trace of the Most High. I do 
not deny that these very beautiful hypotheses 
of ethics would make obligation safe, but my 
impiety is that I do not believe that obligation 
is safe. (Caputo, 1993:15)
If it seems necessary to bolster the moral 
impulse with argumentation denouncing 
inequality, then it is because so much rational 
effort has been expended in delegating or 
even abdicating responsibility in the face of 
economic inequality. In fact, one of the reasons 
why inequality is allowed to continue unabated 
is the hypocritical repression of ethics through 
rational justification. This, according to George 
Monbiot (2014), is one of the many good points 
Thomas Pikkety (2014) highlights in his book 
Capital in the Twenty First Century. “Extreme 
inequality,” so Monbiot paraphrases Pikkety, 
“can be sustained politically only through 
an ‘apparatus of justification’. If voters can 
be persuaded that insane levels of inequality 
are sane, reasonable and even necessary, the 
concentration of income can keep growing.”
Today, the moral impulse must square up against 
this ‘apparatus of justification’, against centuries 
of economic justification and obfuscation.1 
Inequality is either useful, or it is unresolvable. 
Of this, there is metaphysical proof, as the Divine 
itself proclaimed “the poor will always be with 
us”. In the match-up between the moral impulse 
and economic rationality, the moral impulse 
therefore seems poorly prepared. The felt sense 
of obligation has neither an identifiable origin, 
nor can it rely on metaphysical endorsement or 
1 According to John Maynard Keynes, there is no 
end in sight for the morally ambivalent logic of 
capitalist society: “For at least another hundred 
years we must pretend to ourselves and to 
everyone that fair is foul and foul is fair; for foul 
is useful and fair is not” (Keynes, as quoted in 
Skidelsky & Skidelsky, 2013:43).
enforcement. The only option left, according to 
Caputo (1993:38), for those few still beholden to 
obligation in the face of inequality, is to act as 
“obligation’s poet”, to make the case for equality 
look as strong as possible, and “to make in-
difference look as bad as possible, as bad as it is”.
This, perhaps, is the first task conferred on us 
by inequality, the first task we must be equal 
to: to act as poets of obligation, to re-describe 
inequality in the worst possible terms, and to 
re-describe equality in more poetic terms. It 
means articulating and then lampooning the 
rationalisations of inequality. It also means 
voicing inequality’s discontents.
RATIONALISATIONS OF 
INEQUALITY
In its sophisticated forms, the rationalisation 
of inequality proposes that it is the result 
of fundamental economic and democratic 
freedoms. To address inequality in a systemic 
manner, to interfere in the workings of a free 
market, would constitute a form of control, says 
Milton Friedman (1970), and an infringement 
on individual liberty. If we value the principles 
of liberty and property, we cannot force from 
above the redistribution of accumulated 
property.
Robert Nozick (1974), adding an element of 
justice or merit to the defence from freedom, 
argues that whatever we have accumulated 
through just acquisition and transfer cannot be 
forcefully redistributed without compromising 
that supreme value of freedom. What is ‘justly 
acquired’, or what we are ‘entitled’ to, according 
to Nozick, is what we have earned or inherited. 
Taxing what is justly acquired for the purposes 
of promoting the welfare of others amounts to 
little else than forced labour, or forcing a person 
to work for the purposes of another.
The defence of inequality from the perspective 
of freedom therefore claims that inequality is 
the result of free choices in a free market. No 
one can be blamed for it, and addressing it 
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would mean sacrificing the ultimate value of 
freedom. Aligned with this defence is the idea 
that, if no law was broken in attaining one’s 
income or property, then it was ‘justly’ acquired 
– one ‘earned’ it through talent or merit.
In its less sophisticated forms, though parasitic 
on the above logic, the rationalisation of 
inequality allocates blame for poverty or 
inequality. If inequality is the result of talent, 
merit, and free choices in a free market, then 
poverty is equally so. Poverty is the fault of the 
poor. It is through poor economic decisions, 
either their own or those of their parents, 
that poor people find themselves in poverty 
– because they choose to have too many 
children, because they choose to squander 
their earnings, not on self-development, but 
on Freud’s palliative substances, because they 
choose charity over exertion. This type of blame 
allocation sometimes extends into the postulate 
of a ‘culture of poverty’.
Finally, inequality, whether the result of freedom 
or merit, is ironically justified as the solution 
to inequality. The opportunity to pursue self-
interest almost limitlessly, so the argument goes, 
is in everyone’s best interest. This is the Faustian 
bargain contemporary society has struck with 
the help of economists. Skidelsky and Skidelsky 
(2013:43), in reviving the alternative economics 
of John Maynard Keynes (1973), describe this 
bargain as “[putting morality] in cold storage 
till abundance [is] achieved, for abundance 
[makes] possible a good life for all”. The trick, 
explain the Skidelskys, was to dress up the vice 
of avarice as a virtue, now dubbed ‘self-interest’. 
Society can then utilise the ‘natural self-interest’ 
of individuals for the good of all. Hence, Adam 
Smith (1976) (or a selective reading of Adam 
Smith) postulates that unconstrained self-
enrichment promotes general well-being in 
society by creating wealth and opportunities 
from which all benefit. By pursuing financial 
self-interest, free individuals unintentionally 
advance the general interest of society. A 
variation of this argument was prominent 
in the 2012 American electoral campaign, in 
which Mitt Romney (2012) promoted the idea 
that economic challenges are best addressed by 
facilitating the work of so-called ‘job creators’ 
– those who, through the pursuit of profit 
and wealth, create employment for others. To 
restore the embattled US economy, Romney 
argued, will require “[renewed] faith in the 
power of free people pursuing their dreams”. 
Romney therefore combined the defences of 
inequality based on the notions of freedom and 
utility. Free people, pursuing self-interest, are 
more effective in achieving social equity than 
any good-intentioned redistributive measures, 
or any measures directly aimed at social justice.
To summarise, inequality’s apparatus of 
justification consists, mainly, of three 
rationalisations: (1)  inequality is the outcome 
of fundamental economic and democratic 
freedoms, (2)  inequality of holdings is the 
result of differences in merit, talent, or skill, 
i.e. those who have more, have earned more, 
and (3)  inequality (or the possibility of unequal 
wealth) serves society as a whole by capitalising 
on the by-products (wealth and opportunities) 
of self-interested behaviour.
CHALLENGING INEQUALITY’S 
RATIONALISATIONS
To combat the self-satisfied logic that rationalises 
inequality, to make inequality look ‘as bad as 
possible, as bad as it is’, its basic conclusions 
have often been challenged in a reasoned 
fashion. For instance, it has been argued that 
the “ultimate value” of freedom is not protected 
or promoted through the inequality resulting 
from free markets. Instead, the lack of exchange 
capacity and material security implied by 
inequality means that most individuals are 
not ‘free’. Freedom of enterprise, considered 
independently, is not freedom at all, but “the 
liberty to work or to starve” (Marcuse, 1968:2). 
In this situation, there is no semblance of the 
kind of autonomy that allows individuals to 
choose their own ends, and to choose different 
means for achieving those ends.
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It has also been argued that the distribution of 
exchange capacity today is by no means the 
result of just accumulation and transfer. The 
simplest example is inheritance. Inheritance 
effectively nullifies the holy capitalist principles 
of distribution according to productivity, equal 
opportunity, and freedom (Haslett, 2004). 
Inheritance is exchange capacity or wealth 
gained without the need for productive activity. 
At the same time, inheritance distributes 
opportunities and freedom (or autonomy) 
unequally.
South Africa’s mining industry provides an 
equally interesting, if more contentious and 
complex, illustration of the injustice of just 
accumulation and transfer. In a recent report, 
titled Demanding the impossible? Platinum 
mining profits and wage demands in context (2014), 
researchers suggest that mining executives 
and shareholders have, over time, seized an 
increasingly large share of the value created 
through mining activity. When large profits are 
achieved, executives and shareholders allocate 
the lion’s share to themselves. When profits are 
dwindling, executives still earn bonuses, while 
labourers are told their wage demands are 
unachievable. Justice seems far removed from 
such a scenario. Labourers consent under threat 
of unemployment. When labourers suspend 
their consent during wage negotiations, 
their continued dissent comes at the risk of 
starvation. If justice relates to contracts freely 
consented to, there are serious doubts about the 
extent of freedom labour brings to the table. 
If, on the other hand, justice relates to a fair 
distribution (distribution according to input), 
then a disingenuous logic is required to present 
the current income distribution between those 
extracting minerals from the ground and those 
administering the process, as fair or based 
on significant and demonstrable differences 
in input.
These arguments suggest that talk of freedom and 
justice amid inequality is questionable at best. 
Instead, a less unequal society would represent a 
significant gain in both freedom and justice.
Finally, history has debunked the utilitarian 
argument that inequality benefits all. What 
this notion has given us, instead, is a Sisyphean 
infinite loop. We lower taxes, allowing more 
freedom for the privileged, and relax labour 
laws. Economic growth sees some accumulating 
quickly and extravagantly, while others improve 
their condition incrementally. At this stage, and 
inevitably, the boulder we have been inching up 
the hill rolls back, and rolls over the majority 
of those whose positions had only improved 
incrementally. At the bottom of the hill, 
however, we are told the plan is sound. Only 
our execution was flawed. The strategy must 
not change. The solution to the predicament 
remains support for job creators.
The main rationalisations of inequality are 
therefore fundamentally flawed. This is not a 
revelation, and I am not revealing these flaws 
spectacularly in this paper. The fallacies that 
riddle the apparatus of justification have been 
identified endlessly, not only by Marxists 
and radicals, but by prominent economists, 
including John Kenneth Galbraith (2004) (who 
labelled our current economic arrangements 
‘fraud’), Joseph Stiglitz,2 and Ha-Yoon Chang,3 
But while these challenges demonstrate how 
deficient the rationalisations of inequality are, 
and emphasise the losses suffered by those 
on the wrong side of inequality, they do not 
point out what everyone (not only the poor) 
loses in the process. Two forms of loss can be 
added – the loss of individualism and the loss of 
democratic solidarity.
THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY I: 
INDIVIDUALISM
In his essay The soul of man under socialism, 
Oscar Wilde (1891) rejected inequality for its 
detrimental effect on our capacity to realise 
ourselves, for the way it blocks off individual 
possibilities:
2 See Stiglitz, J. E. 2012. The Price of Inequality. 
Great Britain: Allen Lane.
3 See Chang, H. 2010. 23 things they don’t tell you 
about capitalism. London: Penguin Books.
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One’s regret is that society should be 
constructed on such a basis that man has been 
forced into a groove in which he cannot freely 
develop what is wonderful, and fascinating, 
and delightful in him – in which, in fact, he 
misses the true pleasure and joy of living. He is 
also, under existing conditions, very insecure. 
(Wilde, 1891:5)
Wilde’s concern is for individualism, or the 
opportunity for each person “to realise the 
perfection of what was in him, to his own 
incomparable gain, and to the incomparable 
and lasting gain of the whole world” (Wilde, 
1891:1). This sort of individualism is, for Wilde, 
the “full development of Life to its highest mode 
of perfection”. Those who achieve this kind of 
perfection Wilde (1891:2) labelled “the poets, 
the philosophers, the men of science, the men 
of culture – in a word, the real men, the men 
who have realised themselves, and in whom all 
Humanity gains a partial realisation”.
It is important to note, however, that Wilde was 
not only bemoaning the inability of the poor 
to experience the joy of living. The unequal 
distribution of property, of capital, of exchange 
capacity, diminishes the affluent and the 
under-privileged equally. The poor are robbed, 
and “[m]isery and poverty are so absolutely 
degrading, and exercise such a paralysing 
effect over the nature of men, that no class is 
ever really conscious of its own suffering. They 
have to be told of it by other people, and they 
often entirely disbelieve them” (Wilde, 1891:4). 
However, the affluent are equally hampered 
by accumulation. The gains of the rich may 
counter-productively prevent the realisation of 
individualism. As Wilde (1891:5)4 explained,
4 Wilde’s argument is accurate in the way that 
it depicts the existential costs of inequality. 
However, it also contains a problematic 
metaphysical tone: individualism is described 
as realising something pre-existing within 
the individual. This metaphysics is secondary, 
however, and if one replaced Wilde’s 
metaphysical individualism with a more 
Rortyan postmetaphysical conception of “self-
creation” – an ironic experimentation with 
...  the recognition of private property has really 
harmed Individualism, and obscured it, by 
confusing a man with what he possesses. It has 
led Individualism entirely astray. It has made 
gain not growth its aim. So that man thought 
that the important thing was to have, and did 
not know that the important thing is to be. The 
true perfection of man lies, not in what man 
has, but in what man is.
Variations on Wilde’s century-old logic emerge 
today from neo-Aristotelian philosophers 
like Edward Skidelsky (2013) and Michael 
Sandel (2010). While Skidelsky and Sandel 
emphasise the loss of ‘the good life’ in their 
respective writings, their articulations of the 
good life inevitably encompass elements of the 
individualism Wilde defends. Edward Skidelsky 
(in collaboration with his economist father 
Robert Skidelsky) calls this element of the good 
life ‘personality’. By ‘personality’, the Skidelskys 
(2013:160) mean “the ability to frame and 
execute a plan of life reflective of one’s tastes, 
temperament and conception of the good”. The 
idea of personality also includes “an element 
of spontaneity, individualism and spirit”. One 
of the prerequisites of personality is “a private 
space ... in which the individual is at liberty to 
unfurl”. Without personality, they continue, we 
would not be human. Instead, we would resemble 
“a colony of intelligent social insects”. However, 
without financial security, it is improbable 
that this kind of personality will develop. The 
luxury of personality is therefore not allotted 
to the poor. Inequality also presses heavily on 
those who have more, and, consequently, they 
are unable to “isolate [themselves], to keep 
[themselves] out of reach of the clamorous 
claims of others” (Wilde, 1891:1).
The price of inequality is therefore individualism, 
at both ends of the scale of inequality – the poor 
do not have the luxury (of time or resources or 
solitude) to develop personality; the affluent, 
on the other side, are too encumbered by 
a variety of possible re-descriptions – then 
Wilde’s explanation of the detrimental effects of 
inequality is still valid. 
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the duties of property and the relentless and 
insatiable pursuit of wealth, and the business of 
consumption, to attend to personality.
THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY II: 
SOLIDARITY
If inequality comes at the price of solitude, 
individualism, and personality, its price 
(ironically) also includes communality. At 
the altar of inequality we also sacrifice the 
opportunity to interact with others who 
make up our community. The cost is not only 
communality, but also democracy, so prized 
by the rationalisers of inequality. As Michael 
Sandel (2010:266) explains:
Too great a gap between rich and poor 
undermines the solidarity that democratic 
citizenship requires ... As inequality deepens, 
rich and poor live increasingly separate lives. 
The affluent send their children to private 
schools (or to public schools in wealthy 
suburbs), leaving urban public schools to the 
children of families that have no alternative. 
A similar trend leads to the secession by the 
privileged from other public institutions 
and facilities. Private health clubs replace 
municipal recreation centers and swimming 
pools. Upscale residential communities hire 
private security guards and rely less on public 
police protection. A second or third car removes 
the need to rely on public transportation. And 
so on. The affluent secede from public places 
and services, leaving them to those who cannot 
afford anything else.
According to Sandel (2010:267), the result is 
that people from different walks of life no 
longer encounter one another. Apart from 
‘personality’, an unequal world therefore 
withholds the opportunity to develop ‘civic 
virtue’. “The hollowing out of the public realm,” 
Sandel argues, “makes it difficult to cultivate 
the solidarity and sense of community on which 
democratic citizenship depends.”
In a passage that echoes Sandel, the Skidelskys 
(2013) argue that, when inequality exceeds 
certain bounds, a sense of mutual respect 
(necessary for the good life) is lost, and with it, 
democratic society:
An elite that lives, plays and learns entirely 
separately from the general population will feel 
no bond of common citizenship with it. A more 
equal – not completely equal – distribution 
of wealth and income is a requirement for 
democratic solidarity. (Skidelsky & Skidelsky, 
2013:159)
Even though the hidden costs of inequality, 
individualism and democratic solidarity, may 
seem like opposite purposes, recent warnings 
against sending one’s children to Ivy League 
universities successfully combine these purposes. 
Josua Rothman (2014), in reviewing the work of 
William Deresiewicz (2014), combines the costs 
as follows:
Better to go to a state school, where the student 
body is more socioeconomically diverse, or to 
a ‘second-tier’ liberal-arts college, where ‘real 
educational values’ persist, than to submit 
yourself or your child to the careerist ‘machine’ 
of élite higher education ... Americans work 
too much, think too much about work, and 
cultivate an air of competent yet maniacal 
busyness. (Rothman, 2014)
The point of authors like Rothman and 
Deresiewicz is that isolated schools of privilege 
have two disadvantages: (1)  where a student 
body is not economically diverse, education 
is incomplete (i.e. the argument related to 
‘civic virtue’), and (2)  the education of the 
affluent comes at the expense of individualism, 
as students graduate to a life dominated by 
maniacal careerism and busyness.
INTERPASSIVITY: WHAT 
PREVENTS US FROM ADDRESSING 
INEQUALITY
It should be clear at this stage that the moral 
impulse demands a response to inequality; that 
the rationalisations of inequality are defunct; 
and that inequality costs us freedom, justice, 
personality, and solidarity. A final question 
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then remains: Why have we not addressed it? 
If the price is so exorbitant, and the potential 
benefits of increases in equality so laudable, 
why have we failed to act, and why do we keep 
failing daily?
The answer to this question does not necessarily 
lie in a lack of sympathy or fellow-feeling. 
Philosopher Richard Rorty (1998:167-168, 
176) believes that moral progress requires an 
increase in sympathy. For us to attend to the 
needs of the poor and the costs and externalities 
of inequality, we need to re-describe ourselves 
in such a way that the Other of inequality 
is regarded as “someone like us”. If our re-
descriptions are successful, moral behaviour 
towards the poor will become as spontaneous 
as looking out for our friends.
Of course, Rorty has a point. There are instances 
where people are capable of violence against, 
or indifference toward, one another, only 
because ‘the Others’ are not ‘people like us’. 
In discussing the crisis in the Middle East, for 
instance, opposing parties, Jews and Muslims 
alike, dehumanise their opponents, calling one 
another ‘animals’. There are those who similarly 
think of the poor as ‘not sufficiently like us’ to 
earn our respect and warrant moral urgency.
Bracketing the threat of reverting to a totalising 
ethics of ‘the same’, the problem with Rorty’s 
solution is that many people already regard the 
poor as sufficiently ‘the same’. Many people in 
contemporary society have a deep sympathy 
for, and anguish over, the problems of poverty, 
hunger, and inequality. Yet, their fellow-feeling 
does not translate into action.
The reason for our inaction must therefore 
lie somewhere else. It lies in yet another 
mechanism, more insidious that the apparatus 
of justification. It is an apparatus that allows us 
to act in accordance with the justifications of 
inequality, even when we do not believe these 
justifications. This apparatus can be called 
‘ideology’ or ‘interpassivity’.
For Slavoj Žižek (1989:28), ideology no longer 
means “they do not know, but they are doing 
it”. We do not submit to neo-liberal economic 
justifications of inequality because we are 
duped by them. We do not suffer from a false 
consciousness that makes us act in a way 
that serves elite interests without knowing it. 
Instead, today, ideology means “they know 
very well what they are doing, but still, they are 
doing it”. Today, ideology critique can no longer 
mean exposing the false assumptions we cling 
to. They have already been exposed. We do not 
actually believe them, and the act of unmasking 
can therefore have no real effect. Ideology today 
is ‘enlightened false consciousness’.
Consequently, even though we know very well 
that our pursuit of financial self-interest will 
not solve inequality, and will not produce a 
generally wealthy utopia, we continue acting 
out the roles and routines associated with this 
mechanism as if it would work. We do this 
because ideology no longer requires individual 
belief or false consciousness. We can continue 
to act out our roles, because others believe for 
our part, or on our behalf.
This has also been called ‘interpassivity’ or the 
problem of “illusions without owners” (Pfaller, 
2014:15). Interpassivity is an apparatus that 
relieves us of our duties when others act out 
these duties on our behalf. As Pfaller explains, 
the required “attitude or conviction is realized 
through ... external agents”. To explain how 
this apparatus works, Žižek (1989) uses various 
analogies, of which I will mention two.
The first analogy is that of the Tibetan prayer 
wheel. This apparatus allows the religious 
subject to pray without praying, because the 
wheel that is spun to execute the prayer does 
the work on the subject’s behalf:
...   the wheel itself is praying for me, instead of 
me – or, more precisely, I myself am praying 
through the medium of the wheel. The beauty 
of it is that in my psychological interior I can 
think about whatever I want, I can yield to 
the most dirty and obscene fantasies, and it 
does not matter because – to use a good old 
Stalinist expression – whatever I am thinking, 
objectively I am praying. (Žižek, 1989:34)
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Ideology is a similar apparatus. It allows us to 
dispense with the conviction, while persisting 
with the routines associated with the conviction.
The second analogy Žižek (2009:51) uses to 
explain the interpassive logic of ideology takes 
the form of an anecdote told of the physicist 
Niels Bohr. According to Žižek, the famous 
physicist Niels Bohr was once visited at his home 
by a friend. The friend was surprised to find a 
horseshoe mounted above Bohr’s front door – a 
popular ornament in Europe, motivated by the 
superstition that such ornaments keep away 
evil spirits. When Bohr opened the door, his 
friend asked him about it: “Niels, do you believe 
in the superstition that horseshoes keep away 
evil spirits?” “Of course not,” Bohr replied, “I’m 
a scientist, not an idiot.” “Then why did you put 
it up?” the friend asked, to which Bohr replied, 
“I hear it works even if you don’t believe in it.”
Contemporary society’s prayer wheel, its 
horseshoe, is economics (or, at least, free market 
economics). Economics is our interpassive 
response to inequality – that which allows 
inequality to go unattended. Economic theory, 
expert economists, and the whole apparatus 
surrounding the theory (reserve banks, the 
IMF, the World Bank, analysis by economists 
on the news, expectant predictions of the next 
decision regarding the repo rate) serve to assure 
us that the system prays or acts on our behalf, 
that someone believes the pursuit of financial 
self-interest and its ultimate goal of economic 
growth will finally relieve us of the plight of the 
poor, or is, at least, the best and only way to 
address this plight. We can spin the wheel and 
hang the horseshoe, and rest easy. The result: 
we continue working towards promotions or 
increases; we look for better-paying jobs; we 
save to buy the artefacts associated with our 
(or the next) standard of living; we condone 
extravagant executive pay (and even hope 
to be that executive one day); and we refrain 
from giving to the poor, for fear of becoming 
a handmaiden to idleness. No direct action to 
address inequality is required on our part. No 
urgency exists, because interpassive economic 
activity means we are already doing our part. 
For this reason, and because economics has 
convinced us that the insatiability promoted 
by our economic system needs no moral limit, 
the Skidelskys (2013:12)5 label it (the discipline 
of economics) “the chief intellectual barrier to 
realizing the good life for all”.
Challenging this ‘deathly orthodoxy’, the inter-
passive apparatus that maintains inequality, 
is rendered unthinkable through additional 
(strengthening) procedures, of which one is 
‘complexity’. The purpose of this procedure is 
to stave off systemic change. If the economy 
fails to deliver on its promises, then it is because 
it is so complex: “... uncontrollable forces have 
unpredictable consequences; for instance, 
the invisible hand of the market may lead to 
my failure and my neighbour’s success, even 
if I work much harder and am much more 
intelligent” (Žižek, 2012:9-10). If the workings 
of this complex phenomenon are so opaque, 
however, this also serves as a warning not to 
5 It is tempting here to illustrate the way in which 
economics deconstructs itself with reference to 
that seemingly innocent and unimportant phrase 
ceteris paribus. The economist must, through no 
fault of her own, provide us with half of justice, 
and therefore no justice whatsoever, for she must 
operate according to the simple (‘necessary’) 
principle ceteris paribus. It is always offered 
as a qualification, an (unnecessary) aside, and 
yet it is not what follows or precedes ceteris 
paribus that is the key message of economics. 
It is exactly ceteris paribus that the economist 
unknowingly evangelises, preaches, believes. In 
short, economics recognises, from the start, that 
its assumptions only work when ‘all things are 
equal’. Self-interest will promote general well-
being ... assuming all things are equal. In free 
markets, resources will be allocated to the most 
efficient units ... assuming all things are equal. 
These claims already assume that all people are 
equal to the extent that they are self-interested 
utility maximisers. Economics is therefore 
ideal for interpassive purposes. It displays no 
urgency for equality, because it already assumes 
all things equal. The result is that it remains at 
odds with justice, which requires the treatment 
of people as fundamentally different or unequal, 
phenomenologically speaking.
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meddle, to experiment, or even to attempt 
to understand the economy. Best to leave it 
to the experts, to spin the wheel and hope it 
favours you.
CONCLUSION: THE TASKS OF 
INEQUALITY
Given the situation I have sketched, in which 
the moral impulse is confounded, first through 
an apparatus of justification, and then through 
the apparatus of interpassive economics, 
with the resultant costs of freedom, justice, 
individualism and solidarity, inequality does 
seem to confer tasks on us.
First, as poets of obligation we must debunk and 
keep debunking the apparatus of justification, 
not because people are generally blind to its 
fallacious nature, but to rob interpassivity of its 
power by ensuring that its hypocrisy is repeated 
more often than its ‘benefits’. The second 
dimension of our moral poetics is to articulate 
and re-articulate the costs of inequality.
The above poetics would be assisted by, and 
would flourish best within, a revived public 
realm. This can be achieved in two ways. First, 
as the Skidelskys (2013:86-95) and Sandel 
(2010:260-269) recommend, we should bring 
notions of ‘the good life’ back into the public 
fold. These notions serve to emphasise the 
costs of inequality, and they start introducing 
a limit to accumulation. Second, reviving the 
public realm also means reinvesting in public 
spaces. The value and dynamics of public spaces 
cannot be developed here, but has received 
increasing attention from, among others, David 
Harvey (2012).6 For our purposes, public spaces 
promote solidarity, but also slow interpellation 
into a consumerist, careerist, and interpassive 
routine, by allowing for interaction with those 
who embody alternatives.
Finally, the perpetuation of inequality is 
achieved through unconvincing routine, based 
6 See, for instance, Harvey’s arguments around 
urban commons in Rebel Cities (2012).
on failed assumptions. Halting the process may 
therefore require basing new routines on new 
assumptions, even if we are equally unconvinced 
of the new assumptions and routines. For 
instance, instead of assuming insatiability, we 
can assume a point of material comfort that is 
sufficient for attaining ‘the good life’. Instead 
of assuming that people are self-interested 
utility maximisers, we can allow for a variety of 
motivations that exceed material goods. Instead 
of assuming that economic growth will increase 
general welfare, we can accept that markets 
need assistance in allocating exchange capacity 
and material security. Instead of assuming that 
success in business is determined by profit and 
share price, we can establish social and ethical 
performance as the markers of success.
These new assumptions would require new 
routines. Routinely increasing executive pay 
would be replaced with the capping of executive 
pay. Routinely increasing advertising budgets 
would be replaced with limits to advertising. 
Routinely seeking tax breaks to encourage job 
creators would be replaced with increasing 
taxes – for the rich, but also on estates. Routinely 
having social and ethics committees reporting 
to audit committees would be replaced by audit 
and remuneration committees reporting the 
other way around.7 These new organisational 
routines may seem unthinkable. Yet, they have 
been advocated repeatedly by a set of vocally 
anti-neoliberal economists (including those 
mentioned in this article – Chang, Skildesky, 
Stiglitz, and Galbraith), who also emphasise 
that economics and the economy requires no 
particular expertise to change.
Working out the details of new economic 
routines is not my purpose here. Instead, my 
intention is to pinpoint a blockage in our moral 
plumbing. We may have a reservoir of moral 
energy, yet it fails to reach its destination. Put 
differently: we have a lot of water, but no water 
pressure.
7 For this idea, I am indebted to a colleague 
Gwendolyn Zorn.
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Unblocking the moral impulse is, unfortunately, 
not only a matter of debunking rationalisations 
of inequality. Nor can we attempt to have people 
‘own’ their convictions and attitudes, instead 
of acting them out interpassively. Instead, we 
should try to act out new interpassive routines 
that do not deny the problem of inequality, but 
that aims to end it.
The problem of interpassivity resembles the on-
going question in utopian studies of whether 
society is changed by changing individuals, or 
by changing their environment. The suggestion 
of a change in routine represents a middle 
path. Changing routine means changing the 
individual and the environment simultaneously, 
by changing the way individuals relate to their 
environment.
Our proper aim should be to address inequality, 
finally, or, as Wilde (1891:1) would have it, to 
“to try and reconstruct society on such a basis 
that poverty will be impossible”. However, 
if we take seriously the work of Emmanuel 
Levinas (1985) (the philosopher who elevated 
ethics to ‘first philosophy’), this is not possible. 
Even if poverty (the inequality that makes 
people suffer) were structurally eliminated, 
we would not be able to say that we have met 
our obligations. This is because ethics itself is 
a form of (phenomenological) inequality – an 
asymmetric relationship (with ‘the other’) that 
is infinite. As Levinas (1985) puts it:
I am responsible for the Other without waiting 
for reciprocity, were I to die for it. Reciprocity is 
his affair. It is precisely insofar as the relationship 
between the Other and me is not reciprocal that 
I am subjection to the Other; and I am ‘subject’ 
essentially in this sense. It is I who support all. 
... I am responsible for a total responsibility, 
which answers for all the others and for all in 
the others, even for their responsibility. The I 
always has one responsibility more than all the 
others. (Levinas, 1985:98-99)
Even if the elimination of economic inequality 
would not exhaust our moral obligation towards 
others, at least we could anticipate a novel, 
as yet unarticulated obligation to replace this 
same tired one.
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